INTRODUCTION "It is much more material that there be a rule to go by than what the rule is; that there may be a uniformity of proceeding in business not subject to the caprice of the Speaker or captiousness of the members."
It goes without saying that the rules that govern how our country elects a president each quadrennium are something that should be as clear as possible and accepted as binding by all. Otherwise, an incipient constitutional crisis is born.
The value of rules and procedures are most evident when an issue is hotly contested, when consequences are uncertain, and when the stakes are at their highest. From our country's first constitutional crisis in the 1800 election through the imminent 2016 contest, presidential contenders have been highly motivated to seek every advantage possible, and in the event of a disputed election result, each candidate would have irresistible motives to attempt to trade on ambiguities and flaws in the counting process.
Procedure is a funny thing. Invariably hidden among substantive decision-making the vast majority of the time, the means used to navigate inflexion points are largely an afterthought. When consequences are most uncertain, however, and stakes at their highest, the adaptability and flaws of our procedural frameworks are mercilessly laid bare.
A hidden imperfection for the first one hundred years of the Republic, the 1876 presidential election exposed our Constitution's original failure to provide a framework for resolving electoral disputes, bringing about a constitutional crisis in a bitterly contested post-Civil War climate. After employing a constitutionally unique Electoral Commission to award a disputed Electoral College majority to Rutherford Hayes, Congress agonized over the creation of a procedural framework for ten years-finally passing the Electoral Count Act in 1887. 2 The Act placed on a statutory footing the method of appointing state electors, the form in which votes were to be submitted, and most importantly, a number of restrictive procedures that both Houses of Congress were required to follow when tabulating the results. 3 The Electoral Count Act was then consigned to the dustbin of history by everyone except the most astute election law scholars until the United States again faced a razor-thin presidential contest in 2000. While scrutiny of the Act by the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore 4 largely centered on the timing of certification to receive "safe harbor" deference, 5 procedural objections that took place in Congress during the subsequent count gave rise to a number of key constitutional questions that have somehow evaded the academy 6 over the past 2 24 Stat. 373 (codified at 3 U.S.C. § § 1-21 (2011)). 3 
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4 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 5 Id. at 113. 6 See Vasan Kesavan, Is the ECA Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1719 (2002) (arguing that the Electoral Count is meant to be a ministerial duty and that neither House has the authority to judge validity). Kesavan devotes one In order to test the limits of this conflict, this article will first consider the important threshold question of whether the institution that actually counts electoral votes is a constitutionally unique entity or merely a simultaneous meeting of the House and Senate. Neither a plain-text reading of the Constitution, nor congressional intent support the Joint Session reading. Part III will then examine the Electoral Count Act's ("ECA") genesis and relevance through the 1876 election, analyzing the 1877 Electoral Commission's role, and contending that this mixed-branch commission was a permissible exercise of the Rules Clause at the outer limits of congressional delegation.
Part IV will then consider the core issue of whether sections 15 through 18 of the ECA are unenforceable in light of non-delegation doctrine, the Rules Clause, and our system of separated powers. Finally, Part V will proceed to assess the justiciability of these issues in the context of the upcoming 2016 presidential election, arguing that they must be within reach of our federal courts. This article thus contends that the ECA unconstitutionally impinges on Congress's internal procedural authority and is unenforceable, adding ever more uncertainty to an electoral system that has already engendered three constitutional crises in our Nation's history.
II. WHAT INSTITUTION COUNTS OUR ELECTORAL VOTES?
It is necessary that we first outline the framework provisions that govern the counting of Electoral College results and the institutions textually charged with this duty. Amendment XII governs the formal process of electing our chief executive. 12 Before its adoption in 1804 following the aftermath of the 1800 Jefferson-Burr tie, 13 Article II governed this process.
Consequently, Amendment XII provides that " [t] 14 A number of critical constitutional questions can be raised from this provision. The President of the Senate obviously plays an important role in the count, but does this authority extend to the power to make parliamentary rulings? Does he or she have substantive decision-making authority over which votes should be counted, 15 or is this textually demonstrable power merely ministerial, with validity determined by the houses individually or as a group? 16 Additionally, and most crucially for our discussion, is the body assembled to count the votes a unique constitutional entity, that is, a "Joint Session of Congress" with independent procedural authority imbued on this body, or is it merely the House of Representatives and Senate assembled in the same place and retaining their individual powers? THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804 (1994) . A Democratic-Republican elector was reportedly given the task of abstaining from voting for Aaron Burr to prevent a tie, but failed to do so. Joshua D. Hawley, The Transformative Twelfth Amendment, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535-42 (2014) (discussing 1800 and arguing that the adoption of this amendment infused the presidency with a political character that absent from the original text of Article II).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XII, cl. 2. 15 See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 16 A number of theories about where this authority lies were offered by Members of Congress in the ten years between the 1877 Electoral Commission and the passage of the ECA, namely: (1) the President of the Senate; (2) the House (Presidential Electoral votes only) and the Senate (Vice Presidential votes); (3) the House and Senate as a corporate body with each member having one vote; (4) the House and Senate with each chamber having one vote; (5) no one, until Congress appoints a counter by concurrent resolution or legislation (the accepted proposal, e.g., the ECA). See Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious Congressman's Guide to the ECA of 1887, 56 U. FLA. L. REV. 542, 551-52 (2004) . The second proposal seemingly strikes the best balance between efficiency and a robust framework that respects the institutional powers of each House. This method is also supported by Amendment XII's division of authority among the House and Senate in case of a tie.
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1886, a year before the passage of the ECA, Sen. James George also remarked that counting is not a legislative function which ought to be considered separately by the two Houses, but it is rather in the nature of a judicial function; . . . it would be an anomaly surely in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, . . . [that] the rendering of an operative judgment upon the ascertainment of a fact should be committed to two separate tribunals [(the House and the Senate)], each acting independently of the other, and each having a veto upon the other. 22 Consequently, if the House and Senate are classified as a constitutionally independent Joint Session, this body likely has the authority to develop special, binding procedures for counting electoral votes-e.g., the ECA. This stems from the Rules Clause, inherent legislative authority, 23 and that the observation that our Constitution is largely silent on the detailed method to be used. Congress is also granted the express authority " [t] o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . and all other powers vested by this Constitution," including the ex officio authority delegated to Congress to count electoral returns. 24 This view, however, fails to consider important textual evidence. No clear indication exists providing that a Joint Session or convention 25 is to count the votes; quite the opposite 21 See SUBCOMM. ON 27 Secondly, and perhaps most crucially, Clauses 3 and 4 of this Amendment also provide that the House and Senate shall separately elect the President and Vice President in the event of an Electoral College tie, or if the second place finisher in the House vote fails to attain a majority of votes, respectively. 28 Evidence cited supra from Rep. Gallatin's motion that purported to grant the Houses, as a corporate body, the joint authority to judge the validity of electoral votes was also expressly rejected by the Federalist Congress in 1801. 29 Congressional interpretation of this provision throughout the history of our nation has also affirmed this provision to mean that both the House and Senate are largely separate entities.
The Supreme Court has recognized that both the President and Congress infrequently rely on past practices or interpretations as justification for their authority, in areas of textual obscurity. 30 In this way, the "gloss which life has written upon them [the words of the Constitution]," can make "a systematic, unbroken . . . practice, long pursued" worthy of great deference by the Supreme Court, as long as it otherwise comports with the text of the Constitution. 31 33 providing that in the event of a properly raised 34 parliamentary objection during the actual count, the Houses must withdraw to their chambers to separately decide its merits. 35 Based on this gloss 36 and the 117-year lifespan of the ECA as a framework for finalizing presidential elections in Congress, as well as the textual indications discussed supra, the House and Senate would likely be viewed, for constitutional purposes, as separate bodies with independent authority meeting together to count the certificates of vote submitted by the states for President and Vice President.
It is important to also note briefly that the ECA may have a grave constitutional defect even if an independent body exists that is empowered to make rules for counting the votes. Section 17 of the ECA provides that "the two Houses separate to decide upon an objection." 37 This provision-other than affirming the principle that the Houses are actually meeting together as separate entities-could represent an unconstitutional delegation of the Joint Session's authority. 38 In this narrow 32 Act Creating an Electoral Commission, 19 Stat. 227 (1877). 33 See Electoral Count Act, 3 U.S.C. § § 2-7 (2011). 34 An objection seconded by at least one senator and representative. See 3 U.S.C. § 15; see also Part IV infra. 35 See 3 U.S.C. §15. 36 Admittedly, the Supreme Court could theoretically use this doctrine to hold the ECA binding on both Houses, and outside the remit of the Rules Clause, because the ECA has been in place and largely obeyed by Congress since 1887. See Part V infra. However, it would be hard to square this with the Constitution's textual grant in the Rules Clause and Non-Delegation Doctrine, since bicameralism and presentment would involve the President in an area committed to Congress by the Constitution. 37 3 U.S.C. § 17. 38 In this context of a Joint Session, this result follows because the House and Senate are individually empowered by the Electoral Count Act to make finaland possibly conflicting-decisions on the objection. In the event the House and Senate came to opposite conclusions, the governor of the disputed state would cast the deciding vote. Constitutions regulate the day-to-day workings of government, but the inherent value of our system of separated powers is perhaps best displayed when out-of-the-ordinary events appear, placing stress on institutional actors and exposing flaws in inflexion points of decision-making. Chief among the small handful of constitutional crises that our nation has experienced are the 1876 and 2000 presidential elections, both of which largely centered on the disputed electoral votes of the state of Florida. 41 With an election grounded in lingering feelings of sectionalism and the bitter legacy of the Civil War, 42 44 REHNQUIST, supra note 41, at 94. 45 Lewis, supra note 43, at 37. 46 Id. Modern analysis speculates that "without the strenuous adjustments" made by Republicans shortly after the election, at least one of these states would have gone Democratic-electing Tilden. Id. The nature of these adjustments can only be speculated, but it likely involved at least some amount of selective counting by canvassing boards, ballot-box tampering, or similar fraud. See id. at 37-38. 47 The total number of electors in the Electoral College is a function of the number of states in the union and their populations. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators andHouse of Representatives and quickly make Tilden PresidentElect. 49 Reconstruction-era Republican governors heavily controlled the election apparatus in Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Oregon and "the only way the Democrats could influence an official was to buy him"-and hope to not be outbid. 50 In the weeks after the election, Republican "visiting statesmen" from northern states went south to help officials "oversee" canvassing, and by December 1876, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Oregon each submitted multiple sets of electoral votes to Congress for consideration, with at least one Democratic and Republican slate from each state. 51 As a result, both Hayes and Tilden independently had a claim to the presidency that was backed by dozens of potentially fraudulent certificates of vote. 52 While Congress was preparing to meet to conduct the count, this fact became widely known and Candidate Hayes asserted that the Constitution granted the (Republican) President Pro Tempore of the Senate 53 the sole authority to determine which returns to count. 54 Tilden feverishly disagreed, arguing that never before had this officer been permitted to decide upon disputed electoral votes, and that the decision had been previously made in Congress through an objection from the floor. 55 Tilden felt that the best strategy to ensure he won the Presidency was to make no concessions and allow Congress 49 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 50 Lewis, supra note 43, at 37. 51 
Id.
52 See REHNQUIST, supra note 41, at 101-12. 53 As mentioned supra, the Vice President, in his ex officio role as President of the Senate, is constitutionally charged with presiding over the count. However, the Vice Presidency was vacant from 1875-77, so this responsibility would have fallen on Sen. 57 Nevertheless, even though congressional leaders of both parties felt strongly that their respective candidates should be elected, they also agreed that productive steps should be taken to resolve the crisis before open conflict erupted. 58 As a result, President Grant and the House and Senate approved the creation of a statutory commission in the Electoral Commission Act by wide majorities in January 1877. 59 The Commission was composed of five House members, five Senators, and five Supreme Court justices, split evenly on party lines, with the four justices named specifically in the Act electing a fifth justicewidely acknowledged to be "independent" and "apolitical" David Davis. 60 Most importantly, the Act provided that the Commission's recommendations disposing of the disputed votes must be accepted as binding by the House and Senate. 61 Unknown to Congress at the time of passage, however, Davis was appointed to the U.S. Senate by the Illinois Legislature-as a Republican-the day before the Commission was created, giving him the opportunity to demur from this partisan affair. 62 Democrats became furious at this turn of events because each of the remaining justices that could fill the seat were Republican. Justice Joseph Bradley soon replaced Davis, and predictably the Commission voted 8-7 along party lines to grant each of Louisiana, South Carolina, Oregon, and Florida's disputed electoral votes to Hayes. 63 56 REHNQUIST, supra note 41, at 116. 57 Id. 58 
59 Act Creating an Electoral Commission, 19 Stat. 227 (1877). 60 Lewis, supra note 43, at 39. 61 Id. This provision also likely would have been unenforceable. 62 Id. at 40. 63 Lewis, supra note 43, at 163, 167. For an additional viewpoint of the proceedings of the Electoral Commission, see J. HAMPDEN DOUGHERTY, THE With House rules much different than today, 64 Democrats caused "wild disorder" during the count on March 1, 1877, successfully disrupting floor proceedings and blocking consideration of the Electoral Commission report-even to the extent that, "for hours Speaker Randall could not even make himself heard." 65 Southern Democrats were then reportedly promised by Republican leaders in a backroom deal that Reconstruction and the federal troops stationed throughout the South would be withdrawn in exchange for allowing Hayes to be placed in the White House. 66 As a result, Democratic leaders began to allow Randall's "determined, arbitrary, and dictatorial" parliamentary tactics to bring an end to debate and other dilatory motions made from the floor. 67 After eighteen hours of wild controversy, the Commission report was finally adopted, giving Hayes the narrowest winning margin in Electoral College history-185 to 184. 68 ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 136-213 (1906) (recounting the proceedings of the Electoral Commission). 64 For example, the filibuster and disappearing quorum were common tactics used by the minority party until Speaker Thomas Reed largely curtailed these practices in the early 1890s and began to impose the procedural controls marked by the rise of the Committee on Rules and a strong speakership. 
B. A SEPARATION OF POWERS PERSPECTIVE ON THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
The Rules Clause of Article I grants each House of Congress a wide remit to establish, modify, and amend the rules of procedure they will employ to carry out their constitutional lawmaking duty. 69 The idea that a legislative body has inherent plenary control over its own procedures has deep roots in British constitutional traditions, 70 initially born of the desire of the House of Commons to stand alone from the House of Lords in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and develop rules diverging from royal tradition. 71 Based on this spirit, the Rules Clause "vest[s] control over . . . key procedural elements of the enactment process in each House at any point in time." 72 Within this textual grant of power, Congress has nearabsolute authority, granting each chamber the freedom to take different approaches to similar procedures. For example, Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 provides that every bill shall "pass" the House of Representatives and Senate. 73 However, both the House and Senate take varying perspectives on what counts as passage, with the House sometimes employing the "deem and pass" method, 74 and the Senate relying on the sixty-vote cloture requirement as a de facto threshold for passage. 75 The House and Senate also take much different approaches to determining the presence of a quorum. 76 Article I expressly defines a quorum as a majority of Representatives and Senators respectively and requires that all bills pass both the House and Senate before delivery to the White House for signature or veto (bicameralism and presentment). 77 Nevertheless, something less than a voting quorum frequently passed legislation in the late 19th century and was held constitutional. 78 77 See U.S. CONST. art. 1 at § 5, cl. 1; § 7, cl. 2. 78 See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892) (discussing the "disappearing quorum" and the frequent tactic used by minorities at that time to be present in the Hall of the House of Representatives but fail to vote. Speaker Thomas Reed subsequently ordered the Clerk of the House to record non-voting members as present and the Supreme Court accepted this as constitutional, even though only a minority of the full House had actually voted.). 79 See generally Gold, supra note 75. suspension of the rules. 80 Embracing these nuances, federal courts have given each House of Congress, as a separate constitutional actor, a wide berth in reviewing their specific rules of procedure, as long as they comport with other textual requirements of the Constitution. 81 It follows that Congress' use of the Electoral Commission as a fact-finding tool in the midst of the 1876-77 constitutional crisis is likely a valid exercise of the Rules Clause, while also representing the outer limit of potential congressional delegation in this area. The Commission's mandate was to hear testimony from counsel representing Tilden and Hayes, to gather evidence pertaining to the validity of electoral votes from the disputed states, and to issue a final report. 82 Pursuant to this mission, the Electoral Commission was little more than a fact-finder operating on behalf of Congress, in much the same way that committees routinely operate. Committees allow Congress to solve the collective-action problems normally encountered when dealing with large groups of people, allowing legislators to also gain specialized knowledge in a policy area, making the legislative process more effective. 83 However, it 80 See R.K. Gooch, The Legal Nature of Legislative Rules of Procedure, 12 VA. L. REV. 527, 538 (1926) . 81 See, e.g., Ballin, 144 U.S. at 5 ("[T]here should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House. . . . The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."); NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014) 83 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200 (observing that committees "act as the eyes and ears of the Congress in obtaining facts upon which the full legislature can act."); could be argued that, from a constitutional perspective, the Electoral Commission was doing something more significant than gathering facts or taking testimony-it was performing a judicial-like function in passing upon the validity of votes integral to the function of another coordinate branch and resolving a dispute between adverse parties. 84 Could this added feature mean the Commission was unconstitutional?
Not all instances of a body of Congress acting in a quasijudicial role are unconstitutional. In 1989, Mississippi federal district judge Walter Nixon was serving a felony sentence for perjury but had nevertheless refused to resign his office after congressional leaders warned him that impeachment and removal were imminent. 85 The House of Representatives unsurprisingly impeached him, and the charges were dutifully sent to the Senate for trial. 86 The Senate, pursuant to its rules, appointed an Impeachment Trial Committee to "receive evidence and take testimony," holding four days of hearings, during which ten witnesses were called. 87 The Committee then presented the Senate with a complete transcript of the proceeding, reported the uncontested facts, and summarized the contested issues for the full body to make a final determination of Nixon's fate. 88 Subsequently removed from office by the requisite two-thirds majority, Nixon brought a federal suit, claiming that because the Senate had "the sole Power to try all Impeachments," 89 use of the word "try" meant that a judiciallike fact-finding proceeding was required before the full Senate, and that the body had unconstitutionally delegated this textual demand to the Impeachment Trial Committee. 90 The Supreme Court, agreeing with the D.C. District Court and Court of Appeals below, found that this controversy was moot-the Senate had the "sole" power of impeachment, and commiserate with this plenary grant of power, 91 the Senate is free to define "try" in any manner it chooses, 92 including the use of a committee to carry out the fact-finding function. 93 Justices Blackmun and White, as part of a unanimous Court, specifically emphasized that the use of a committee to carry out part of the impeachment process was a permissible exercise of the Rules Clause, as long as the Senate as a whole had the final word. 94 The Senate's ultimate control over this process was likely dispositive, since much in the same way federal magistrate judges often first issue reports and recommendations in federal civil suits that are later reviewed by a district judge, 95 senators had the opportunity to conduct a de novo review of the record made by the Impeachment Trial Committee and had a final, independent say in removing Nixon from his position as a judicial officer of the United States.
Nixon stands for the proposition that the Senate has broad leeway in trying impeachments as a legislative body, even though this is a quasi-judicial function. This case accentuates 90 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229 (recounting Petitioner's argument that "'Try' means more than simply 'vote on' or 'review' or 'judge.' In 1787 and today, trying a case means hearing the evidence, not scanning a cold record."). 91 Id. at 235-36. The Justices of our Supreme Court are even subject to this power. 92 Id. at 230. 93 Interestingly, the Senate only uses this committee method during the trial of inferior officers. During the impeachment of President Clinton in 1999, the full Senate acted as both a fact-finder and jury. 95 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636 (B)(1)(A-B) (2009) (outlining the authority of a federal magistrate judge).
both the freedom and the limitations placed on Congress' power to delegate pursuant to the Rules Clause. Both the House and Senate are inherently free to use any method of internal delegation they think prudent or well-adapted to aid the execution of their constitutional responsibilities, but the individual Houses, as corporate bodies, must maintain the final authority to approve or reject a decision. 96 Even though the House and Senate may change how they interpret and accomplish these tasks, it may not surrender ultimate control to another entity, either internal or external of Congress. Therefore, the Senate may not delegate its authority to conduct impeachment trials to the House, nor would the House be permitted to allow the Senate to elect a president in case of no candidate receiving a majority. These duties are textually conferred by the Constitution to each house, in the same way that both the House and the Senate are given the independent authority by the Rules Clause to determine how they will conduct business. 97 As a result, the Impeachment Trial Committee utilized by the Senate and the 1876 Electoral Commission are both within Congress' power of delegation and rulemaking, but simultaneously stands for the outer boundary of this authority. Any transfer of dispositive control or influence on procedure matters wholly internal to the House or Senate to an actor outside the membership of the House or Senate, respectively, would fundamentally impinge the procedural sovereignty vested in each house by the Rules Clause. In this way, Justice Souter's Nixon concurrence noted that some procedures employed by Congress could potentially act beyond the scope of their 96 101 The weeks that followed saw recounts in four Florida counties and numerous lawsuits challenging the counting methods utilized to determine voter intent. 102 The Florida Supreme Court eventually decided these challenges against Governor Bush, prompting his legal team to seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court days before the ECA's safe harbor 103 deadline-a point in which deference would be granted to the election results certified by Florida's (Republican) Secretary of 98 Id. at 253-54 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "a coin toss" or "summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply 'a bad guy'" might warrant review). State six days prior to the nationwide meeting of the Electoral College in December. 104 Many were in front of their televisions on December 12, 2000 when the United States Supreme Court finally put a period on the contest. In a deeply polarized 5-4 decision, justices held that the diverging tabulation standards being used in Florida's recounts were an equal protection violation and that insufficient time before the safe harbor deadline existed to make changes to the counting standards 105 -effectively granting Bush victory because of his marginal lead in the vote totals.
However, the election's true legal coda did not occur until three weeks later, on January 6, 2001. Congress, meeting to count the nation's electoral votes pursuant to the Twelfth Amendment, had the task of opening the electoral certificates of vote from each of the fifty States and the District of Columbia. Members waited with baited breath as President of the Senate Al Gore and congressional vote-tellers worked their way through the alphabet down to Florida. 106 As one of the tellers remarked that "this is the one we have all been waiting for," 107 Gore dutifully read the certificate from Florida that sealed his 271-266 defeat in the Electoral College.
At that moment, Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-FL) rose to object to the inclusion of the Sunshine State's twenty-five electoral votes, seeking to offer a formal challenge to their validity based on the litigated counting irregularities and alleged 104 Schicker, supra note 40, 720-22 (2000 Mr. DEUTSCH. 'Mr. Vice President, there are many Americans who still believe that the results we are going to certify today are illegitimate.' The VICE PRESIDENT. 'The gentleman will suspend. If the gentleman from Florida has a point of order, he may present the point of order at this time. Otherwise, the gentleman will suspend.' Mr. DEUTSCH. 'Mr. Vice President, I will note the absence of a quorum and respectfully request that we delay the proceedings until a quorum is present.' The VICE PRESIDENT. 'The Chair is advised by the Parliamentarian that section 17 of title 3, United States Code, prescribes a single procedure for resolution of either an objection to a certificate or other questions arising in the matter. That includes a point of order that a quorum is not present. The Chair rules, on the advice of the Parliamentarian that the point of order that a quorum is not present is subject to the requirement that it be in writing and signed by both a Member of the House of Representatives and a Senator. Ms. McKINNEY. 'Mr. President, I object to Florida's electors, and in view of the fact that debate is not permitted . . . and pursuant to title 3, I move that the House withdraw from the joint session in order to allow consideration of the facts surrounding the slate of electors from Florida.' The VICE PRESIDENT. 'The Chair will remind the Members of the joint session that even though a Member's motion may affect only one House, the statutory principle of bicameral signatures must, nevertheless, be applied. The gentlewoman remarkably attempting to overturn the parliamentary rulings of Vice President Gore on the previous motions by appealing to the full membership of the House and Senate. 111 Each was overruled perfunctorily, with Gore meekly advising each that "reading the Electoral Count Act as a coherent whole" 112 required that he overrule each objection because they were not seconded by a senator, in writing, pursuant to the statutory requirements of the ECA. 113 Beyond the political fervor in the air of the Hall of the House of Representatives on this day, and Democratic expressions of "solidarity" 114 with Vice President Gore, these overruled objections give rise today to the fundamental question of whether the ECA is constitutionally enforceable in light of the Rules Clause, entrenchment, and the doctrine of non-delegation.
will suspend. Reading sections 15 through 18 of title 3, United States Code, as a coherent whole, the Chair holds that no procedural question is to be recognized by the presiding officer in the joint session unless presented in writing and signed by both a Representative and a Senator. Leaders of large organizations are busy people. They frequently have large staffs, however, enabling them to delegate many of the tasks for which they are formally responsible by allowing others to act with their authority. When all authority is concentrated in one individual, this arrangement is perfectly acceptable because the executive cannot arrogate further powers-he/she possesses them already. In a system of separated powers, however, when governmental authority is divided as a structural protection, delegation to another constitutional actor can result in controversy over the propriety of government action and an imbalance of authority.
James jurisprudence. 118 As a result, the legislative and other functions of Congress are divided and entrenched both within our all-toofamiliar three branches of government, 119 but also within Congress itself.
The structural feature of this internal separation of powers promotes accountability in that "when decisions are properly made in [the right House of] Congress, electoral controls on individual members" 120 are extremely powerful, allowing the public to readily identify where decisions that affect their lives are being made. This horizontal division of powers among the House and Senate represents the Founders' belief that Congress was more likely to aggrandize power than any other entity in the Federal Government. 121 Even though Congress works together as a bicameral body to enact legislation, a number of tasks exists that are unicameral, for example, origination of revenue legislation in the House of Representatives (Article I, Section 7, Clause 1), impeachment and trial (House: Article I, Section 2, Clause 5; Senate: Article I, Section 3, Clause 6-7), treaty ratification (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2), and officer confirmation (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2-3). Based on one interpretation of the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 122 
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Vol 13:4 366 force of law after an express delegation through bicameralism and presentment. 123 These powers were allocated in large part based on the Founders' considerations of institutional competence, 124 the need to satisfy both large and small states at the founding, 125 and the belief that no one actor should possess the entirety of the national legislative power. 126 In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court considered a provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act that permitted either the House or Senate to individually abrogate a deportation suspension order of the Attorney General via ordinary resolution. 127 The Court subsequently held that this veto was sufficiently legislative (i.e., individual modification of immigration law-not unlike a private bill) to mandate passage via bicameralism and presentment. 128 Consequently, the Nationality Act provision authorizing this one-House action was an unconstitutional delegation by both the President and Congress. 129 126 This belief was underscored by the fact that many of the Framers believed that late eighteenth century state legislatures enacted far too many illconsidered laws. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) ("the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been already suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defense, has been inferred and proved."). 127 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923-29 (1983). 128 Id. at 951.
York that the Line Item Veto Act's grant of authority to the President to cancel individual appropriations was defective because President Clinton had "effectively amended an act of Congress by repealing a portion of it." 130 These cases establish that the Supreme Court has been careful to restrain Congressional actions to change the internal composition of its powers, whether an external delegation (the President), or an internal shift (one House veto). One commentator has carried this conclusion further, noting that "all the separation of powers cases seem to go against Congress." 131 One area the Court has been reluctant to journey into, however, are internal Congressional rules, as each House is issued a nearplenary grant of authority by the Constitution to set the procedures under which it will operate. 132 The Rules Clause is granted near-absolute deference because judicial review of congressional procedures has historically been limited to the narrow situations when "its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights." 133 C.
RULEMAKING STATUTES "I'll let you write the substance, you let me write the procedure, and I'll screw you every time." 134 One of the reasons the Supreme Court found the legislative veto unconstitutional in Chadha was that the statute improperly allowed one legislative institution to act without the required consent of other players through bicameralism and presentment. 135 Based on the principles set forth in in this case, as well as Clinton and Nixon, the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered" 136 framework of our constitutional design means the powers of the House and Senate cannot be transferred, altered, diminished, or increased. The House cannot demand a vote on a Supreme Court nominee, nor could the Senate impeach and try an officer by itself. Most importantly, it follows that neither house can transfer or limit control of its internal, enumerated Rules Clause authority.
Let us consider the Electoral Commission Act of 1877 and the Electoral Count Act of 1887. Section 2 of the 1877 Act provided that the Electoral Commission's report disposing of the controversial certificates of vote was privileged-requiring that after the Commission's decision had been made, "such decision shall be read and entered in the journal of each house, and the counting of the votes shall proceed in conformity therewith, unless, upon objection made thereto in writing by at least five Senators and five members of the House of Representatives." 137 The Act provided that "no debate shall be allowed and no question shall be put by the presiding officer, except to either house on a motion to withdraw," and, [T]hat when the two houses separate to decide upon an objection that may have been made to the counting of any electoral vote or votes from any State . . . each Senator and Representative may speak to such objection or question ten minutes, and not oftener than once; but after such debate shall have lasted two hours, it shall be the duty of each house to put the main question without further debate. 138 The ECA mirrors many of the same provisions used by the Electoral Commission. First, in order to receive objections, any motion made during the count must be presented in writing and signed by both a Senator and Representative. 139 Similarly, section 17 provides that no debate shall occur in the main assembly, and that both members of the house and senators cannot speak for longer than five minutes after withdrawing from the count to consider the objection, and that the "main question" of upholding or sustaining the objection is to be put to each individual house after two hours of debate. 140 Finally, section 18 of the ECA provides that neither debate nor motions shall be entertained, except on a motion to withdrawprovisions nearly identical to the 1877 Commission Act. 141 138 Id. at § § 3-4. 139 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2011) (providing that " [u] pon such reading of any such certificate or paper, the President of the Senate shall call for objections, if any. Every objection shall be made in writing, and shall state clearly and concisely, and without argument, the ground thereof, and shall be signed by at least one Senator and one Member of the House of Representatives before the same shall be received. When all objections so made to any vote or paper from a State shall have been received and read, the Senate shall thereupon withdraw, and such objections shall be submitted to the Senate for its decision; and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, in like manner, submit such objections to the House of Representatives for its decision.").
Congressional rulemaking statutes, like the ECA, are uncommon, but not unheard of in the United States Code. 142 Numerous frameworks enacted by Congress delineate a special procedure for the House or Senate to follow in considering particularly controversial areas of policy. 143 Naturally, this legislation serves a valuable collective action benefit, allowing the procedural statute to serve "a coordinating function between the two Houses, announcing focal points (such as numerical deadlines) so that legislators from one house may shape their behavior." 144 In this way, when considering policy areas of great sensitivity or complexity, Congress has attempted to minimize initial disagreements over how a decision is to be made, 145 allowing it to focus instead on substantive policy, much like the ECA has sought to streamline the inherently political process of ratifying the winner of a presidential election.
Rulemaking statutes are not the "silver bullet" they were intended to be, however. From the first procedural statute enacted as part of the Reorganization Act of 1939 through the Trade Promotion Authority passed in 2015, 146 most procedural provisions 147 -other than the ECA-found in the U.S. Code include an anti-entrenchment provision that specifically states that the enacted procedure is promulgated pursuant to the Rules Clause of the Constitution, and that either house is free to follow, modify, or ignore the statutory procedure at any time without further action or amendment to the statute. 148 In this way, these rules are "essentially hortatory or directory; they have no legal effect on the rule-prescribing power of the houses" whatsoever. 149 Metzenbaum v. FERC 150 addressed the nature of these procedural statutes, in a controversy where the plaintiffs asked the D.C. Circuit to invalidate a statute enacted in violation of an earlier rulemaking provision contained in the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act. The reviewing court held that the two houses retained completed control over their own rulesespecially in situations when an earlier provision enacted as statutory law purported to entrench itself. 151 No such provision exists in the ECA, and yet this act was nevertheless enforced as absolutely binding in the face of sustained House objections during the January 6, 2001 count.
Similarly, long standing precedent of both houses recognizes that rulemaking statutes are generally hortatory. Persuasive authority used by the House Parliamentarian to advise the Speaker states that the House of Representatives has previously deferred to procedural statutes enacted in the same session of Congress. 152 This reasoning is presumably rooted in the fact that a provision is more normatively legitimate when it has been expressly ratified by the members of the current legislature. Likewise, while the Reorganization Act of 1946 153 broadly establishes committee jurisdiction and other procedural rules in statute, the Senate has acknowledged that it is authorized by the Rules Clause to change procedures enacted in this statute via a simple one-house resolution because they govern operations that are wholly internal to Congress. 154 Custom and usage 155 of the Houses also emphasizes that Congress has ignored "statutized" rules in the past when found to be cumbersome or inexpedient. Speaker James Orr ruled in 1858 that a statute providing that Congress would consider bills appropriating funds to claimants who were victorious in the newly established Court of Claims was unenforceable and that claims bills would no longer be placed on the House Calendar. 156 Two years later, a Member-elect objected to the adoption of House rules before the Clerk of the House and members were sworn, citing a 1789 statute 157 that required that oaths be the first order of business after an organizational session was convened. 158 Over a century later, Rep. Trent Lott reportedly objected to consideration of additional aid to the Nicaraguan Contras in 1986 on the basis that the resolution failed to comply with an existing statute providing for fast-track procedures for international aid. 159 Speaker Tip O'Neill issued a parliamentary ruling that stated that the rule reported out by the House Committee on Rules and accepted by the full body had abrogated the prior statute. 160 Five years before, the House ignored the Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation Act's statutory procedure 161 of this separate constitutional organ, 163 to enact rules governing its operations because none exist in the Constitution. Because no unique body exists, the Electoral Count is merely a meeting of the House of Representatives and Senate in the same room. As a result, the House and the Senate, as the same entities, are still bound by the other textual requirements of the Constitution, one of which requires that the House and Senate have absolute authority over their own internal procedures, a provision not suspended during the hours in which Congress ratifies the election of our next president. This plenary authority requires that the House and Senate be free to debate, make motions, and withdraw from the count at any time as they wish, the ECA notwithstanding, subject, of course, to motions passing by the requisite majority of that house.
The inclusion of anti-entrenchment provisions in the Congressional Review Act, Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the Reorganization Acts of 1939 164 and 1946, the Congressional Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, 165 and the majority of other rulemaking statutes allows either House of Congress to ignore its own mandate, and is fully compliant with the Rules Clause because each House still maintains the absolute authority to determine their individual rules of procedure. Instead, lacking this provision, the ECA purports to entrench itself, violating the Rules Clause and improperly involving another legislative chamber and the President.
Integral to the non-delegation doctrine is that fact that another constitutional actor cannot have dispositive control over another institution's textually enumerated authority. Because the ECA is statutory law subject to bicameralism and presentment, requiring the President's approval improperly delegates to our chief executive a veto over internal Congressional procedures which our separation of powers prohibits. 166 More importantly, pursuant to Vice President Gore's interpretation of the ECA in 2001, 167 the Senate has dispositive control, vis-à-vis the House, over whether an objection to Florida's electoral votes was debated, the determination of the presence of a quorum in the House during the meeting, and even the power of the House to independently leave the count. Such a result is inconsistent with the Rules Clause and runs counter to most other statutory rule-making provisions, and in any event, is clearly unenforceable based on the parliamentary traditions of both houses.
Rigid enforcement of the Electoral Count Act's provisions by a member of one house (e.g., President of the Senate Al Gore) against members of another house (e.g., the House objectors) therefore improperly delegates procedural control of a standalone House of Congress to the other chamber-abrogating the fundamental individual constitutional prerogatives 168 of both the House and the Senate. Moreover, the ECA cannot be amended or ignored by one House of Congress alone since any scenario requires the involvement of another actor-short of a constitutional crisis, that is. 169 Enforcement of the ECA's procedures also impermissibly entrenches these measures, as individually applied to either the House or Senate. 170 A basic principle of constitutional law, one 166 See SUBCOMM. ON COMPILATION OF PRECEDENTS, COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 44-13, at 229-30 (1877); Siegel, supra note 16, at 561. 167 Again, Gore's January 6th ruling requiring a senator to sign a motion to withdraw from the count appears to be irreconcilable with section 5 of the ECA (providing that either House may withdraw without the consent of the other). 169 This is perhaps the greatest flaw of the ECA. Changes would require the acquiescence of the President of the Senate during the count that the ECA is hortatory, or a statutory amendment achieved through bicameralism and presentment. 170 Requiring the consent of another actor in amending rules that are subject to a lower internal threshold (e.g., a motion to waive or amend the rules of the House or Senate made by one of the members of the body and approved by that House).
But see Bruhl, supra note 6, at 355-77 (asserting that the entrenchment of legislative rules is not burdensome because of Rules Clause authority to abrogate, but incorrectly failing to observe that the ECA has been enforced against the House of Representatives without any measures to change of "the most familiar and fundamental principles, so obvious as rarely to be stated," 171 is that "one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors." 172 Each sequential legislature has equal lawmaking authority, and statutes purporting to limit changes that future lawmakers can make or requiring a supermajority for amendment, can be repealed entirely by ordinary statutes by a simple majority, the text of the original law notwithstanding. 173 It follows from this proposition that legislatures are free to adopt new rules of procedure at the opening of a session or subsequently during a session depending on preexisting rules. 174 Though less clear to nineteenth century legislators, because rule-making statutes were largely foreign to them, a number of Congressmen stated during debate on the ECA that this measure would attempt in vain to entrench procedures that would bind future Congresses. 175 As Vice President Gore restricted the ability of the House to exercise its vested Article I procedural rights, this action effectively entrenched the text of a statute above the Constitution, limiting the authority of the House to unilaterally change this onerous limitation, 176 because it must gain the assent of both the Senate this provision short of the concurrence of the Senate or an amendment to the ECA). and the executive, itself a violation of the non-delegation doctrine. 177 while the Republican candidate's party continues to control the House. The count is tied up in Florida's courts, and as a result, the Florida Attorney General and Secretary of State independently certify two certificates of vote, one Republican and one Democratic. 182 Therefore, the actions of Congress will be dispositive in deciding which slate of electors to validate.
Vice President Joe Biden naturally seeks to take advantage of every opportunity to award the Democratic candidate the disputed electors, while the Republican House wants to debate the subject, or better still, obstruct the count long enough to throw the election into the House, pursuant to Clause 3 of Amendment XII. 183 General Counsel in tow, the House, meeting down the corridor in Statuary Hall in the Capitol, passes a resolution 186 that disclaims the authority of the ECA and the Senate to bind its internal procedural discretion, and authorizes a lawsuit 187 to challenge the Vice President and the Senate's unilateral actions. A constitutional crisis over the enforceability of the ECA's procedural provisions is born.
Few expected an obscure voting mechanism in South Florida and equal protection doctrine to decide the 2000 election. If the political history of our country teaches us anything, it is that flaws in our election system eventually are exposed-and what can happen will eventually happen. The parties are incredibly motivated to use whatever means at their disposal to win an election, especially the Presidency, and our election law framework must be robust enough to account for every risk. Returning to our hypothetical, the General Counsel of the House of Representatives quickly scribbles out a motion for injunctive relief on a notepad and then walks across Constitution Avenue to the federal district court. Quickly passed upward, will the Supreme Court even reach the merits of the House's claim that the Act and the actions of the Senate are unenforceable?
The seminal doctrine governing controversies that involve a political question is the familiar case of Baker v. Carr. 188 In this case, the Warren Court laid out six criteria for 186 The institutional standing of Congress as a whole is unchallenged. determining whether the Court should reach the merits of a question or abstain from entering the political "thicket." 189 The Baker doctrine is a monument to judicial restraint, and consequently, the federal judiciary is hesitant to intervene in a controversy when the coordinate constitutional actors involved "possess ample political resources with which to protect their interests." 190 Any possible institutional dispute between the House and Senate during an Electoral Count would not likely be resolved by normal political processes because this question would fundamentally be a challenge over the inherent powers of the Houses and the enforceability of the ECA-i.e., a classic affirmation of the Court's role "to say what the law is." 191 In Chadha, the House of Representatives, arguing that a one-house legislative veto was constitutional, stated that the Supreme Court's review-of a procedure internal to Congresswas beyond the reach of the courts because the legislative process was textually committed to Congress, a coordinate political department, and that this case was fundamentally "an assault on the legislative authority [of Congress] to enact" the provision, citing the first, and most commonly used, Baker factor. 192 The Burger Court, however, disagreed, finding that the separation of powers dispute inhering among the Executive and Congress rendered this case a justiciable political question, and that "if this [argument] turns the question into a political question, virtually every challenge to the constitutionality of a statute would be a political question," also remarking that "no policy underlying the political question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive . . . can decide the constitutionality of a statute." 193 When the Court decided similar separation of powers issues in Bowsher v. Synar and Clinton v. City of New York, no non-justiciable political issues were found, in spite of the lead role granted to Congress in these areas. 194 The remaining Baker factors militate in favor of review as well, since the standards for reviewing the ECA are well-defined (constitutionality/enforceability and the Rules Clause) (factor 2), separation of powers disputes are classically judicial (factors 3-4), and finally, because a judicial decision is critical to decide the presidency (factors 5-6).
In addition to the Baker factors, the Court's previous reticence to examine internal Congressional matters must also be weighed. In Field v. Clark, the Court established the "enrolled bill rule," which held that courts will not look beyond the text of a bill and the signature of the presiding officers to examine possible procedural defects in passage, for example, whether a tax provision really passed both chambers, or was mistakenly inserted by just one and sent to the President. 195 Similarly, in Ballin, justices examined the constitutionality of House rules meant to defeat the disappearing quorum, and found that the Rules Clause was ambiguous in this areadelegating this issue to the House's discretion. 196 The Nixon Court also relied on this deferential doctrine to say that the method employed by the Senate to "try" a judge during impeachment proceedings was exclusively an issue for our upper chamber. 197 193 Id.
382
The Court's deference in this area is not absolute, especially when an inter-branch controversy, 198 200 Nevertheless, this controversy was found justiciable, even though reconsideration was an internal procedural matter, because "the construction to be given the rules affects persons other than members of the Senate" 201 -separation of powers and Appointments Clause grounds. 202 Our 2016 hypothetical would be an analogous controversy.
The 1892 Ballin quorum decision also established boundaries on the Court's "expansive" deference 203 to the internal workings of Congress, stating that Congress "may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints." 204 In the same way, the Rules Clause expressly grants absolute procedural freedom to each House of Congress, and the ECA's procedural limitations, combined with the actions of the Senate in our hypothetical enforcing them, acts to patently ignore this constitutional restraint on regulations limiting the Houses' authority.
Most importantly, it is also important to acknowledge, from a pragmatic perspective, that if a constitutional crisis in the 2016 election occurred, only the federal courts would likely be detached and respected enough to be capable of resolving the crisis-short of an unlikely Congressional compromise-and that much like Bush v. Gore, some institution must be universally accepted by all parties in our government to have the last word. While our federal judiciary would normally be reticent to insert themselves into such a contested political issue, failure to do so in this scenario would lead to the collapse of workable government. Accordingly, understanding the separation of powers concerns inherent in this case and the nature of the constitutional issues raised by the ECA, it is likely that review of the Act's procedural provisions would be a justiciable question in this unique setting.
VI. CONCLUSION
"It is the height of folly to shut our eyes to this danger. . . . The only safe solution to this problem is their removal by a constitutional amendment that shall make plain and simple every step in the process, both State and national." 205 Individuals experiencing a major transition in their lives often find similarities reminding them of the past in their new environments, underscoring the force of the popular expression, "the more things change, the more they stay the same." 206 So it is with our system of electing a president. It is not an accident that a heated dispute surrounding the Electoral Count Act erupted during the 2001 Electoral Count or that three of the United States' major constitutional crises centered on disputed elections. A lack of detail surrounding the procedures to be used in electing a president is perhaps the greatest failing of the Founders. 205 See DOUGHERTY, supra note 63, at 402 (quoting Sen. Henry L. Dawes in 1876). 206 Quote widely attributed to Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr, LES GUÊPES (Jan. 1849).
Alexander Hamilton noted in 1788 that selection of a chief executive was "almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without . . . the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents." 207 In spite of this optimism, through the decisions and compromises of 1800, 1876-1877, and 2000, we have inherited an electoral system that places a premium on ambiguity and ad hoc fixes. After the 1800 election uncovered a fatal defect in Article II, Amendment XII was ratified-allowing electors to vote separately for president and vice president, but failing to detail the specific procedure Congress should use to tabulate this choice. This ambiguity laid the seeds for crisis in 1876-1877 when the State of Florida and four others submitted multiple (likely fraudulent) certificates of vote, leaving Congress to hurriedly cobble together an ad hoc Electoral Commission to resolve this dispute, in the midst of many calling for "Tilden or Blood!" 208 Congress then agonized for ten years over an effective policy alternative to this chaos, finally enacting the Electoral Count Act in 1887. However, as the 2000 election has shown, this Act contains numerous ambiguities and constitutional defects itself, laid bare by the procedural objections raised in the Hall of the House of Representatives during the Electoral Count on January 6, 2001.
A basic framework of election law entrenches two key principles. 209 First, the system establishes a structure through which the mechanics of an election can operate, indicating decision-making points for candidates and robustly accounting for all possible alternatives. 210 This principle, above all, ensures fairness and predictability in our system of laws, with both winner and loser accepting the validity of the process, even if they are disappointed with the result. Election jurisprudence, secondly, must protect the procedural equality of voters, ensuring both a meaningful right to cast a vote and the 207 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). 210 Id. unshakable assurance that his/her choice will be weighed the same against all others. 211 Through perpetuating the ambiguities inherent in our presidential election system and raising numerous constitutional concerns, the procedural provisions of the ECA fall short of these ideals. The ECA's procedural mandate to the House and Senate fails to respect the notion of political equality. Our "finely wrought" Congressional system mirrors the interests and rights of the people and States, 212 and a statute that impermissibly deprives one Congressional actor, that is, the House or Senate depending on the circumstances, of its procedural prerogatives lessens the ability of our representatives to influence the machinery of government in the manner intended by the Constitution. Fundamentally, the fatal flaw of the ECA's procedural provisions is its simultaneous delegation of the rostrum during the Electoral Count to the President of the Senate, while simultaneously providing no means for the House (or potentially the Senate) to assert its independent constitutional prerogatives.
Unlike the hopes of Thomas Jefferson, 213 a candidate engaged in a heated dispute over a state's electoral votes cannot be assured of an orderly or predictable process during the Electoral Count because the ECA's procedural mandate strips each House of Congress of its procedural authority, unconstitutionally countermanding the text of the Rules Clause.
Some might believe that an unenforceable law is better than no law at all. 214 However, in the context of resolving a contested presidential election, an unenforceable law inevitably leads to chaos since candidates and their surrogates 215 will not hesitate to challenge the validity of a 117-year old statute that is facially unenforceable. A strong procedural framework seen to 211 
Id.
212 This duality is reflected in our Electoral College system, in which voters select a slate of electors who in turn vote on a state-weighted basis for President and Vice President. 213 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 214 Siegel, supra note 16, at 564. 215 Members of Congress in this case. be fair and known to have teeth is the best prophylactic against chaos.
Understanding the Supreme Court's recent separation of powers formalism, 216 the ECA today represents "a torpedo planted in the straits with which the ship of state may at some time come into a fatal collision." 217 A procedural framework that respects our system of separated powers, affirms the institutional prerogatives of Congress, and comports with the text of the Constitution must give rise to procedures that can withstand the stiffest challenge during a contested election, when both the stakes are paramount and legal creativity is high. Improving the ECA now and allowing our policymakers to negotiate changes in the best interests of the country "when the political facts of the moment are least likely to distort our considered legal judgment" 218 is crucial.
A familiar national discussion has existed for a long time on whether the Electoral College should be discarded in favor of popular election-making the Congressional count moot. 219 However, if we choose to retain this system, the Electoral Count Act should be discarded, and a new constitutional amendment ratified establishing a clear, scrupulously detailed method for counting electoral votes in Congress, addressing the procedural posture of the Houses, and outlining how disputes will be resolved.
Shortly after his narrow victory was ratified by the Electoral Commission in 1877, President-Elect Rutherford Hayes remarked that "[b]efore another Presidential Election, this whole subject . . . ought to be thoroughly considered, and a radical change made. It is probable that no wise measure can be 216 See Garry, supra note 118, at 717. devised which does not require an amendment of the Constitution." 220 Over a century later, the heightened threshold for a constitutional amendment will allow the country to arrive at a true national consensus, and put an end-at long last-to a hovering uncertainty that continues to linger over our presidential elections and a history of untimely constitutional crises.
